The Historical Roots and Identities of Local Strongmen Groups in Indonesia

Yanwar Pribadi [1]

Abstract

This paper deals with the historical roots and identities, nature and characteristics of local strongmen groups in Indonesia, and aspects of violence in Indonesia. In the rural colonial Java, there were rampok-bandits and *jago* groups; whereas today in Banten there are *jawara* groups and elsewhere in Indonesia people commonly recognized *preman* groups. In this paper I will focus on these four groups: rampok-bandits (or bandits), *jago, jawara,* and *preman.* These groups are parts of the long-established strongmen groups that have characterized Indonesian history. Among the questions addressed are: what is the origin and what are the characteristics of local strongmen groups in society? How does violence embody in the way of life of local strongmen groups? What is their position in society? How do they characterize local cultures in their place of origin?

Keywords: Rampok-bandits, Jago, Jawara, Preman, Violence

"Saya seorang *jawara" (I am a* jawara)
-Tubagus Chasan Sochib (Tempo Interaktif, 3 December 2007)

A. Introduction

Perhaps there is no such bold and outspoken public figure in Banten after the collapse of the Suharto administration besides Tubagus Chasan Sochib. He was a successful tycoon and a legendary figure in the *jawara* world in Banten, who happened to be the father of Ratu Atut Chosiyah, a former of Banten.

This paper deals with the historical roots and identities, nature and characteristics of local strongmen groups in Indonesia, and aspects of violence in Indonesia. Among the questions addressed are: what is the origin and what are the characteristics of local strongmen groups in society? How does violence embody in the way of life of local strongmen groups?

What is their position in society? How do they characterize local cultures in their place of origin?

In the rural colonial Java, there were rampok-bandits and ***jago*** groups; whereas today in Banten there are ***jawara*** groups and elsewhere in Indonesia people commonly recognized ***preman*** groups. These groups are parts of the long-established strongmen groups that have characterized Indonesian history. In general, strongmen groups have been identifiable in many places in Indonesia. However, I will not discuss strongmen groups outside Java. Consequently, in this paper I will focus on these four groups only: rampok-bandits (or bandits), ***jago, jawara,*** and ***preman.*** One has to perceive these local strongmen groups different from strongmen in politics. The latter exercises authority through money and social control, whilst the former can be seen as a sub-type of local gangster who benefits from his fearsome and held-in-awe reputation in order to reap economic benefits and political influence.

B. Indonesian experiences with violence

Several authors have observed aspects of violence in Indonesia. Ingrid Wessel considers violence in Indonesia as the legacy of the New Order although she believes that the struggle for manpower and goods, for access to trade and the struggle against enemies in pre-colonial times were always connected with violence.[2] Henk Schulte Nordholt best portrayed the creation of a state of violence by the Dutch colonial government.[3] Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad support this argument by stressing that violence has deep historical roots long before the Suharto administration came into being.[4] Kees van Dijk collects the explanations that caused explosions of violence in the New Order: 1910s when Sarekat Islam was established following the anti-Chinese sentiment, the 1948 and 1965-1966 massacres, the Darul Islam rebellion, and the early months of Indonesian revolution.[5] Meanwhile, Ariel Heryanto proposes 'state terrorism' to label prevailing violence during the Suharto era. He argues that the mass killings of 1965-1966 were the foundation of the authoritarian style of the New Order.[6]

A struggle for power using physical force and assault causing bodily injury to others can lead to the implementation of political violence. It was partly the outcome of VOE' s quest during the last decades of the seventeenth century in Malaka, Makassar and Banten and the mounting expansion of colonial administration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that led to the massively-shared violence experienced by Indonesians. One of the reasons was the lack of staff and of a regular police

force. Moreover, it was the colonial and local authorities that to a large extent provided criminals with opportunities to maintain their power .[7] The state of violence was not only indicated by strongly repressive actions of the Dutch command in waging wars in the Netherlands East Indies or in responding movements of peasant unrest that marked the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Java, but also by the implementation of discriminatory laws. The Dutch authority reinforced and undermined the priyayi (local aristocracies) class. By incorporating the regent and his sons into the administration, the colonial rulers provided them with Western bureaucratic standing and authority and detached them from the patrimonial system in which they played an integral part. Priyayi and some indigenous high administrative and military administrators were brought under the purview of the European procedural code, while native commoners-those who rose against oppressions caused by the increased taxes, revenues, or services demanded of them-along with the Chinese, Arabs and Indians (The Dutch authority named these groups 'Foreign Orientals') were subject to different legal arrangements established for natives (adat law). This distinction based on a person's racial status determined where one could live, what taxes one paid, and how one was punished. Ironically, the later Indonesian political elites adopted the most repressive side of colonial legal structure.[8] In addition, Siegel offers another way to view the roles of criminals in the colonial period. Accounts written by Eurasians (multiracial individuals, mostly of European and Indonesian) on criminalities and criminals were abundant and as these Indo people were losing contact with their Dutch fathers during the end of the nineteenth and at the onset of the twentieth century, they attempted to align themselves with the Dutch administration against criminals who were depicted by them as natives.[9]

Aspects of violence in Indonesia arose from the peculiar set of indigenous elements of Indonesian society and the conservative Dutch administration system that governed the affairs of the subordinate bodies of native bureaucrats. I would assert that although Indonesians (or Javanese, for they have been the majority in Indonesia) have been portrayed as 'a palladium of peace'[10] or 'the meekest people in the world'[11] or 'the most gentle people on earth';[12] and Indonesia has been ranked 67th in 2010 Global Peace Index,[13] above People· s Republic of China (80th), The United States of America (85th) and India (128th) as the four most populous countries in the world that comprise around forty-five per cent of world population, Indonesia is a violent country. Pre-colonial Indonesia was marked by banditry and its repression. The development of banditry was

endorsed by the weakness of traditional states in the archipelago in maintaining peace and order. The periods of shortage and unfavorable crises of droughts, floods, epidemics, strong winds and heavy rains at harvest or animals that devastated the crop worsened the circumstances. Banditry was mostly directed against property and people. In this case, we can assume that people here mean peasants. Poor peasants whose household had little scope for maximizing profit were their easiest prey. As a result of this flaw, the weak authorities attempted to solve problems of crime by violence. Moreover, pre-colonial times also recognized extinct violent traditions. Colombijn analyzed two examples of them: the headhunting and running amok.[14] I shall add *carok,* a Madurese tradition of fighting in the name of honor that still exists up to present day. Furthermore, after the Europeans came and particularly after the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) sought to establish trade monopolies by conquering strategic places, the Dutch worsened the weakness of traditional states. VOC · s aggressive expansions in sources of spices or vital seaports in Malaka, Maluku, Makassar and Banten were marked by wars and violence. Like many other Governor-Generals of the Netherlands East Indies, Jan Pieterszoon Coen was regarded as national hero in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, for many natives he was seen as one of the most violent administrators of VOC.[15] Besides the colonial wars waged after the Dutch established the Netherlands East Indies, the construction of *De Groote Postweg* or the Great Mail Road connecting Anyer in west Java and Panarukan in east Java (later it connected Anyer with Banyuwangi) that cost the lives of thousands of unpaid indigenous laborers, was also a period of violence. The architect of the road, Herman Willem Daendels or 'Tuan Besar Guntur' (Mister Thunder) as local population would call him, was seen as an authoritarian 'Iron Marshall'.[16]

The nineteenth and early twentieth century Java witnessed series of rural unrests. Sartono Kartodirdjo seemed to simplify the causes of many peasant unrests as he pointed out most to economic factors. In his magnum opus of Cilegon revolt of 1888, he examined a religious revival in nineteenth century Banten. The increase of religious activities was not only due to the fact that the people were pious adherents of Islam, but also due to the fact that there was disruption of traditional order and, concomitantly, enduring social unrest and thus, the religious revival in Banten can be identified as a religious-political movement, which accommodated various social strains. However, the religious revival became a means of recruiting people for rebellion, rather than a purely religious movement.[17] However, in another work he stressed the significance of

religious groups who were treated with distrust by authorities and underlined their potential for conducting political agitation and hostility toward the *priyayi* and the Dutch power.[18] Nonetheless, I would argue that the uprisings can also be regarded as religious movements, because religious institutions, such as *tarekat* (Muslim brotherhood) and communities played some part in these movements. The possible triggers perhaps can be identified as the resentment against the Dutch domination and the powerful hostility towards foreigners, which also found outlet in allegiance with extremist religious movements.[19]

If one asks the most violent period in Indonesia before the Suharto administration came into being, Smail,[20] Anderson,[21] Reid,22, Lucas,23, Robinson,[24] and Cribb[25] may seek explanations in the Indonesian revolution from the early months of the war of independence until the recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949 when a number of history makers competed in a struggle for power. Analysis of the revolution has grown in sophistication and in its grasp of the complexity of forces involved. The revolution witnessed a significant number of social unrests. Indonesia during those disturbances was in a route to freedom as factions of the country's political elites and bands of armed revolutionaries challenged the foreign forces to replace the old Indies social and political system. Deeply oppressed by colonialists marked by a ready use of violence for hundred years, the revolutionaries responded by spreading terror, causing numerous victims in both sides. The whole process of independence was traumatic for the whole archipelago. The revolution period hardly brought social harmony. Sufficient explanations with looking at the socio-economic background, political context, leadership, ideology and military affairs should be drawn to assess such a period.

When we discuss the Indonesian revolution, we cannot speak enough about the number of people who were set to fight and die in defense of the nation or how the foreign rulers attempted to acquire their former colonies back. It was true that in the name of national identity, other manifold and somewhat overlapping identities such as those based on class, ethnicity and religion were also noticeable. Furthermore, in many other national revolutions, the intensity of people's devotion and dedication is also a striking fact that usually accompanies their commitment that leads them to devote and sacrifice themselves to the nation. This proposition is corresponding with Benedict Anderson's 'imagined political community', as he argues that the imagined political community enables people to share a common identity with other people they have never met, are never likely to see, meet, or talk to.[26] The Indonesian revolution is

absolutely a heroic period in Indonesian history. Students of elementary school through high school are taught how patriotic the Indonesian freedom fighters were. The courage of the youth is symbolized in bamboo spears and red-white bandana. The 17 August Independence Day is always celebrated in almost all parts of Indonesia, and thus creates an unbalanced history. Banditries, militias, rage, frenzy and violence during the blood-spattered national revolution have yet to locate a place in Indonesian history.[27] In fact, it was in this period that brigands found their momentous times. Criminality was rampant as the relationship between state and criminals was ambiguous. In Jakarta, gangsters and young left-wing nationalists formed a coalition that played a significant role between 1945 and 1949. This coalition remarkably survived even though the revolution came to an end, despite the suppression from the Dutch power and the Indonesian authority.[28]

What actually made the prevailing attitude among the youth during the revolution survived? The answer-in line with 'imagined political community'-may be found in the 'national identity'. It has been argued that national identity is derived from the concept of a shared homeland, historical memory and common myths and plays important parts in elements of ethnic community, such as a shared sense of solidarity.[29] It is in this sense that the *pemuda* (the youth) pressed the Japanese authorities to shift more rapidly toward independence and criticized older founding fathers for their timidity and passivity in responding to the changing situation. For the *pemuda,* an immediate and autonomous proclamation was very important for its own sake, as a symbolic expression of liberation and self-determination.[30]

The *pemuda,* everywhere in Java, along with ordinary crowds took over control from the Japanese after August 1945. They usually began with the government offices on which attention had been concentrated. Soon, however, the movement spread wider to include everything controlled by the Japanese. In Bandung, the radical time began with the seizure of government offices. Organized groups of *pemuda* within the offices themselves were responsible for this action. In the course of six months of violence, vast shifts had taken place in the social and political order of the Bandung area, some of which were to be permanent. Like any other area, the national revolution in Bandung was also a period of violence.[31] Abductions, assaults, rape and arson were almost daily realities. These were directed towards the Dutch, Chinese, and all other foreigners as well as ex power-holder of Indonesian aristocracies who were seen as traitors.[32] The *pemuda* organized themselves into local groups agitating society and

terrorized villages. There were also regional armed forces in many parts of the country whereas Muslim groups unified themselves in Hizbullah and Sabilillah groups, while romanticized bands identified themselves with names such as Beruang Merah (Red Bear), Harimau Liar (Wild Tiger) and Banteng Hitam (Black Wild Bull).[33] In Jakarta, the Japanese occupation provided the underworld its first taste of the opportunities offered by major political change. Bands of militia directed their attentions to the newly vulnerable houses of landlords and merchants. Death squads in south of Batavia found Europeans and Chinese residents of the city who fled for the mountains, while to the east the main victims were local Chinese.[34] In addition, the revolutionaries also directed their strikes against armed forces. For example, on 19 October 1945, eighty-six Japanese naval guards who were on their way to be interned in Ciater were slaughtered in Bekasi. A month later, on 23 November, a squad of British Indian troops was massacred after their Dakota had crashed near Bekasi.[35]

How is it possible that under certain conditions, 'national identity' would promote violence? The nation and the state are linked to the effort for national self-determination, in the name of authority, territory, and political power. This leads to primary possibility of violence due to the chance of loss control of the state and the domination of force and rule over the territory. This is well demonstrated in the concept of political autonomy.[36] The concept of political autonomy is perhaps well suited in the political conflict in Bali during the first year of the revolution. Riot, turmoil, disorder and disarray were prevalent and terror took on serious proportions when the Dutch troops arrived in March 1946. It seems clear that the kingdoms in Bali declined into chaos and political conflict as a result of strong resistance on many parts of the island to the return of the Europeans.[37] Hence, competition, conflict and violence between countries have been central to the historical emergence of nation states as were evident in the Bali case.

Undoubtedly, twenty years after the Indonesian independence we saw the inauguration of the most violent period in the country's history. The New Order era that replaced the Old Order period was established as a result of a coup and massacre that took lives of half a million to a million human beings. The killings were results of a failed revolution in what is known as Gerakan 30 September/PK! (G30S/PKI). Subsequently, the alleged members of the Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia - PKI) became victims of the massacre. The party and the ideology, including the supporters were eliminated from the country. Even though the army encouraged the killings, the large parts of the massacre were executed by

armed forces-incited civilians, such as the youth section of Nahdlatul Ulama, Ansor. In Bali, the most notorious groups of killers were *tameng.* They consisted of militant Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) youths dressed in black shirts and armed with knives, spears and firearms. Ansor from East Java also took part in the killings.[38]

The killings paved the way for the new administration and created 'state terrorism' to refer to violence demonstrated in the new period.[39] Although the new rule was authoritarian in nature, they made little attempt to monitor the implementation of laws in the lower level of society. A strong vigilantism tradition in which local communities became accustomed to autonomy in identifying and punishing crime was able to exist. The massacre of 1965-1966 took place and was justified by the idea of vigilantism.[40]

Another violent feature in the history of the New Order period was the attempted genocide of East Timor that began in 1976. A successful campaign in 1975 and the annexation in 1976 brought East Timor to the possession of Indonesia. Subsequently, the East Timorese carried out resistance. The Indonesian armed forces responded by perpetrating military campaign until about 1980. The occupation was estimated to have about 200,000 deaths. One of the reasons behind the invasion of East Timor was that the Suharto administration was afraid that a left-wing East Timorese might provide a safe place for resurgent Indonesian communists. This fear was directed toward Fretilin, a local faction in East Timor.[41] Although the time of extreme political tension in 1965-1966 was not comparable to that of the East Timor massacre period, it seems that communism was an archenemy of the Suharto administration. Consequently, all actions related to communism or suspected of having communism aspects were directly eradicated, making the government very repressive in nature.

The New Order government seemed to be able to penetrate deeper into society and to dominate local society to a much greater extent than its colonial predecessor. The New Order also marked the beginning of a long period of neo-colonial rule. Furthermore, despite the apparent dominance of the center, the regional elites showed tremendous resilience and managed to survive. Apart from appointing military and ex-military to strategic positions, the government also appointed its local agents among the descendants of the old aristocracies. In many places the new government and the old elite shared a hatred for leftist and Islamic movements.[42] Komando Jihad (1977), Jama'ah Imran Movement (1981), The Tanjung Priok Riot (1984) and GPK Warsidi Lampung (1989) were some examples of how the leftist and Islamic movements reacted toward the

New Order's anti Islam policy. However, the government was too powerful for them. Accused of organizing efforts to establish an Islamic state and of rejecting Pancasila as the sole ideology, they were effectively suppressed by the government.

In sum, the historical roots of violence in Indonesia can be traced back to the pre-colonial times when the use of violence was socially and culturally legitimated by the prevailing norms and values as demonstrated in headhunting, running amok or *carok*. Nevertheless, I do not suggest that Indonesians are violent in nature. It was the symbolic action of the natives when they expressed their ways of ritualistic behaviors, ultimate vindication of honor and simply the messages people wanted to convey. The more institutionalized violence then was introduced by the foreign rulers of Europeans-and later the Japanese-when colonial expansion created the state of violence.

C. Bandits in Colonial Java

Rural people in Indonesia were vulnerable. In Java, during the Dutch colonial period there was enough population pressure to keep incomes low and underemployment common. People in the countryside were poorly connected with each other. During this time when emigration was difficult and the protection of the central state uncertain, rural inhabitants remained eminently vulnerable. At this time, banditry was rampant and strongmen took advantage of weak law enforcement, challenging the reputation of the island as a place of safety. Moreover, it was the colonial authority that to a large extent provided criminals with opportunities to maintain their power.[43]

When discussing banditry, one may notice E.J. Hobsbawm. He coined the term 'social banditry' in *Primitive Rebels: Studies* in *Archaic Forms of Social* Movement in *the 19th and 20th* Centuries.[44] He further developed it in Bandits.[45] He suggested that: 'social banditry is universally found, wherever societies are based on agriculture (including pastoral economies), and consist largely of peasants and landless laborers who are ruled, oppressed and exploited by someone else, such as lords, towns, governments, lawyers, or even banks'. This Marxist historian distinguished three types of banditry: the noble robber or Robin Hood type, the primitive resistance fighter or guerrilla unit and the terror-bringing avenger.[46] Furthermore, he also dealt with three aspects of banditry: "1. A phenomenon of social discontent, or closely connected with it; 2.The curious but significant coexistence of banditry with more ambitious or general movements of social insurrection; and 3.The rather backward and primitive situations in which banditry is

found to play the role of a movement or phenomenon of social protest and rebellion".[47] Hobsbawm is persistent in his arguments. In his three works, he repeatedly stated that social bandits are outlaws, people living in the peasant society who are regarded as criminals by the state but not by the peasantry since their enemies are the same as the peasants. In fact, peasants see them as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice and such addressed-labels lead to the admiration of social bandits by the peasantry.[48] The relation between peasants and bandits makes banditry 'social'. He stressed the important roles of peasants as groups where the bandits come from and he further emphasized how peasants become fiery supporters of the bandits based on their same adversaries.[49]

One of Hobsbawm ·s critics, Anton Blok, suggests that bandits often terrorize the poor and the weak and that interdependencies between lords, peasants and bandits are far more complex than social banditry, and thus Hobsbawm ·s social bandit is closer to myths and legends than to reality.so Moreover, Blok argues that all bandits are 'social' like all human beings and they are linked to other people by various ties. To understand the behavior of bandits, one needs to look at other groups, classes or networks with which bandits form specific configurations of interdependent individuals. It means that bandits need protection in order to operate and to survive.s[1] Blok objects to Hobsbawm ·s too much attention on the peasants and the bandits themselves.

Another Hobsbawm ·s critic, Pat O'Malley, also questions the term 'peasantry' who support social bandits as well as the term 'pre-capitalist' or 'pre-industrial' that is regarded by Hobsbawm as 'conditions which are necessary for the existence of social banditry'.s[2] To show us that brigandage can happen outside the peasantry world and in fact appears in capitalistic society, O'Malley portrays the Ned Kelly gang and the land struggle between 1878 and 1880 in Australia. Kelly gang was supported by the bush telegraph, a network of informants who provided detailed information about police's movements. These informants consisted of the selectors (small farmers) and rural workers. From here, O'Malley has argued that Kelly's resistance was a class struggle, considering the fact that besides the police who became their main adversaries, the squatters (large-scale, bourgeois pastoralists) and the professionals (lawyers, school teachers et cetera.) were also the opponents of the bushrangers (Kelly and the gang). O'Malley concludes that the modus operandi of Kelly gang reflected that of Robin Hood; battling against the enemy of the poor. Consequently, they gained respect and support from the unfortunate. Ned Kelly typically represented what Hobsbawm called social bandits. However, Kelly did not

exist in 'pre-capitalist' or 'traditional peasant' environments where Hobsbawm repeatedly advocated as conditions where social bandits can operate. Furthermore, the selectors cannot be classified as 'traditional peasants' since they were heavily involved in capitalist agriculture and allied with the rural working class. More importantly, Australia in the end of the nineteenth century was an advanced capitalist region. All of his arguments seem to deny that of Hobsbawm on peasants, capitalism and banditry.[53]

Looking back to Hobsbawm's proposition, he distinguished social banditry from two kinds of rural crime: the activities of gangs drawn from the professional underworld (common robbers) and communities for whom raiding is part of the normal way of life.[54] How did social banditry in Java take place? In order to do understand it, we firstly need to discover who the bandits in rural Java were. Nevertheless, the ideal and romantic bandit-types according to Hobsbawm barely existed in rural Java. Two novels from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by well-informed Dutch writers in the Netherlands East Indies may give us comprehensible pictures about banditry in Java. Isaac Groneman and P.C.C. Hansen Jr. or his pseudonym Boeka with their Een *Ketjoegeschiedenis* and *Pah Troeno* respectively, were aware of what was happening in the island. Groneman spoke about *kecu* group or bandit gangs that were widespread and were recognized by the Dutch authority as *roverbende, bendewezen, roverij* or *roofpartij* to denote these groups. *Kecu* were groups consisted of usually more than ten men. There were some other names to identify these bandits: *koyok, kampak,* or *rampok.* There were also *bajingan,* petty thieves (in the contemporary Indonesian term we may call them *penjahat kelas* teri), *begal* and *pencoleng.* Groneman was largely concerned with the current prevailing situation that deteriorated due to the Dutch extensive control over the society. The extensive control was blamed since it led to cruel exploitation of the indigenous population by Europeans and Chinese. Such exploitation caused increasing misdeed, banditry, rebellion and violence.

Some parts of Java were really notorious for outlawry. Java's North Coast, Banyumas, Kediri-Madiun and the Greater Batavia were only a few to mention. In 1919 and 1920 a total of 170 *'rampokpartijen'* (bands of robbers) were reported to have wandered in the district of Meester Cornelis alone.[55] We may follow the idea that the growing landlessness and ruin of the peasants in the turning of the twentieth century along with numerous resistances were several causing-factors behind the banditry. Boeka admitted that there was a high degree of insecurity in Java, which caused unfavorable circumstances to the morality of the population and led to disgraceful situations.[56] C. Amand, a tobacco planter, reported that cattle theft,

extortion, opium smuggling, violence, and especially intimidation were daily phenomena. His report may offer us some curiosities about the rural world in Java. Furthermore, it is not surprising to discover that wide-ranging networks of rural crime constructed the framework of Javanese villages as Amand stated: 'the more thieves live in a *desa,* the greater the advantage to the *kepala* (head)'.[57] Carel Poensen, a Dutch missionary who spent thirty years in Java suggested that even though Javanese had been Muslim for centuries, most of them or *bangsa abangan* never prayed. Pious Muslims have been (or at least were) a minority and they have been distancing themselves from the majority of the society.[58]

Back to the banditry, it seems that banditry was prevalent in Java because mostly of peasant's protest. Banditry has even been identified as the simplest form of rebellion due to its difficulty for the authority to handle.[59] In peasant's protest, the role of informal leaders cannot be neglected. The religious leaders, such as *kiai* in *pesantren* or guru (religious teachers) often assumed political leadership. They were extensively believed to possess mystical attributes and magical abilities that made them enjoyed charismatic power and a high social position in society. Most bandits who had been farmers before became robbers usually learned *(berguru) ilmu* (literally knowledge, it can also mean magical science or martial arts) in *pesantren* or other religious institutions not only for religious *ilmu,* but undoubtedly also for *ilmu kebal* (invulnerability). For instance, *kiai* in Banten not only taught Islamic religious learning, but also martial arts. Pupils who were more talented in practicing martial arts became known as *jawara.*[60] *Kiai* had to be a leader of people whom the Dutch and later the Islamic modernist movement disliked; because he led them in a direction they considered narrow and conservative.[61] We have to remember that in the course of few decades, in Banten, there was an intensification of fanaticism in *pesantren* circles and a hostile and aggressive attitude came to be ingrained into the *santri* (pupils) towards both the foreigners and the *priyayi.*[62] However, it did not automatically turn the foreigners and the nobles into the victims. Most victims were simply farmers. Like what Blok suggests, bandits usually lived close to their victims. In fact, some of them lived in the same village and some others were even close neighbors.[63] Bandits directed their actions against property and people. Forms of violence were embodied and were unavoidably common. Even if bandits acted upon the rich, they did not give their booties to the poor. One of the most legendary bandit figures in colonial Java, the notorious Pitung, who operated in Batavia and who has been believed as the Indonesian Robin Hood and has been romantically depicted as a hero in the struggle against the corrupt coalition between the

local aristocracies and the Dutch administration in many movies, was not more than a common robber, an outlav„. After his death, he in fact became more famous as stories, ballads, and *lenong* performances (popular traditional play in Jakarta) have passed down his tales. However, no evidence has been found that Pitung distributed his loots to the poor.64 Therefore, Hobsbawm' s romanticized social bandits were far from reality.

Banditry was very difficult to suppress. Although after the Europeans came, practices of headhunting, running amok and cannibalism were successfully eradicated, banditry was somewhat complicated to eliminate. The colonial authority even had to send Marechaussee[65] to the Netherland East Indies in order to battle rampant banditry in the period when peace still reigned between 1920 and 1940.[66] It was certainly a very extraordinary situation since in colonial Java solving crimes was largely an aristocracy responsibility or in other words, the regents, *wedana* (regent's assistant), and assistant *wedana* who formed the upper level of the aristocracy administrative structure were charged by the Dutch administration with identifying people who threatened *rust en orde* (peace and order). It was the assistant *wedana,* the aristocratic official who was most responsible for conducting a criminal investigation in his sub district.67

We now turn to *jagabaya. Jagabaya* appeared as police in villages. They were officially assistants to the police chief. Their task was to,guard against offences and they were active in connection with crimes such as murders, thefts, arson, brigandage, and fights among villagers.[68] They were not ordinary villagers due to their ability in magical and martial arts. Their profession was crime, both its perpetration and detection, and they could offer their services for anyone who could pay them. As rural police, they could make use communai property and were exempted from routine compulsory services. Villagers may pay *jagabaya* secret agents. Alternatively, *jagabaya* work individually for their livelihood. They had an ambiguous relationship with the rural population; they were both feared and admired. Some exercised a virtual reign of terror in their regions, but others were seen as champions of peasant rights for their struggle against the Dutch and the aristocracies.[69]

In line with an old belief of Javanese tradition, using thieves to catch thieves, *jagabaya* were seen as a possible solution in eradicating banditry. The colonial authority via local administrations made use of these intermediaries to enforce local peace. *Jagabaya* could be employed since they had broader range in encountering with elements in society. Underworld in rural areas *(alam* peteng) was hardly known by ordinary villagers. It does not mean, however, that this world was not likely to penetrate. There were

lower village functionaries whose duty was to guard villages from criminals. These functionaries who were called *kapetengan,* often worked together with *jagabaya.* Sometimes these *kapetengan* were jagabayathemselves. There was no strict division between the good guy and the bad guy. *Jagabaya* were fond of gathering in opium dens. They were also in favor of gambling and prostitution. The encounter with individuals from *alam peteng* created a beneficial side for *jagabaya.* They were aware of what was happening in the secret society and thus were employed by any party whose interests were infiltrating *alam peteng.*

In *alam peteng,* band of robbers might fall into three main types, mating *krowodan, maling tengah* and mating *ketut.* Mating *krowodan* or casual thieves formed the largest of these categories. They were mostly non-professional criminals. Mating *tengah* frequently acted alone and hardly ever roamed far places or in other words, they had limited scopes. Mating *ketut* or more known as *kecu* frequently operated in gangs and ventured in far places from their home. They were dangerous and feared.70 The kecuusually knew each other if they had worked together in the past, but if they did not work together it was not always the case that they recognized each other. They did not merge in one vast group, but sometimes they connected to each other when they were fond of each other's banditry plans. In some cases the bandits put *janur kuning* around their heads as a sign of recognition, or as an image of hate. [71]

Even though bands of robbers could be so violent, they were inclined to use non-violent methods in their operation. Violent actions appeared if there was no other way to avoid it. They preferred to use several kinds of mantra and other variants of magical-mystics to cast deep sleep on the victims *(aji sirep).* Cautious thieves also complied with spirits, particularly ancestral spirits, guardian spirits and those spirits believed to watch over certain days of the week. The leaders were usually endowed with mystifying powers that the followers had a strong conviction that their leaders were really able to emanate magical powers. They were also equipped with *jimat* (amulets) to reject *bala* (calamities) and evil spirits directed to them. [72]

The idea of charisma is well known in Indonesian society. It was not only the religious elites who were assumed to possess charismatic power, but also underworld leaders. Leader-follower relations in bands of robbers mirrored those of *guru-murid* (teachers-disciples) in religious circles of the *pesantren* or *tarekat* world, allowing the leaders to enhance their power. Bandit chiefs usually possessed *jimat* that provided them with invulnerability and invisibility through *ziarah* (pilgrimages) to holy graves or

holy places, such as *gunung keramat* (sacred mountain), huge and old trees or big stones. *Ziarah* to those sites was also thought to indicate the time when robberies may be committed or the methods to execute the burglary. Due to the charisma possessed by the leaders, the followers became loyal and obedient to them. A *benggol,* (a leader of a band of robbers) in rural Java frequently led his gang until he was too old to be in charge of his band or until he died.

The colonial administration attempted to eradicate banditry by arresting *kecu* gangs. For instance, under the reign of Sultan Hamengku Buwono V, shortly after the Java War began, a band of robbers under its leader, Gobang Kinosek was captured. The members of the gang had very eerie and frightening nicknames, such as Kandang Jinongkeng, Dadoeng Sineret and Pentung Pinanggul. Pentung Pinanggul for example, means a cudgel bearing in a shoulder, while Gobang Kinosek indicates a big and sharp dagger ready to use. These scary names were designated to frighten their victims, mostly peasants who could easily be affected. For the authorities, it was not their names that caused problems, but their misdeeds. Gobang Kinosek and his gang were chased and killed, and their heads were separated from their bodies to show other bandits and potential criminals that harsh punishments could be executed for such malicious thugs. In some way, the efforts of the government faced unexpected situations. The populations eventually admired these outlaws by visiting their graves and honored them, especially during *Ruwah (Sha'aban,* the eight month of the Islamic calendar).[73]

The Gobang Kinosek case, in which a ruthless sentence was performed, was only a few exceptions. The prevailing conditions gave us an impression that the authorities were unable to cope with crimes in rural Java, especially in areas without European inhabitants. Most thieves were free to re-operate albeit they were previously detained.[74] In practice, ordinary bandits and other kinds of bandits were not easy to distinguish. In the following pages we will encounter with *jago, jawara* and *preman* who have also been considered as types of social protest and rebellion.

D. *Jago:* Master of Underworld

Jago are undoubtedly the most notorious and discussed strongmen in the literature. A significant number of studies have examined *jago* whether the authors of these studies are interested in violence, protest movements, or power brokerage in colonial Java, the Netherlands East Indies or Indonesia. While the term may offer a common perception for scholars working on subjects ranging from history, anthropology or

sociology, it can also invoke a sense of anxiety from scholars of criminology, politics and area studks. It is not only that the term may be vague, but also that it can be abused. Since the term *jago* has been widely used and also mistreated, I am also concerned with how the term has been embedded and perceived in the literature dealing with subjects I have mentioned.

Jago literally means cock or fighting cock. The use of the word *'jago'* does not always have negative connotations. In the contemporary period, one, for instance, can refer to a mathematician as *'jago matematika',* although certainly to identify an infamous thug who commits crimes, one may use *'jagoan'.* Though *jago* were notorious in colonial Java, almost every region had its own word to identify such figures, such as *brengseng* in Banyumas; *warok* in Ponorogo; *bromocorah* in Kediri; *bangkrengan* or *gento* in Tegal; *tenggaong* in Pemalang; *jawara* in Banten, Batavia and West Java.

The historical roots of the *jago* lie in the pre-colonial period, during the time of royal wars and periods of violence in Javanese history.[75] Their new roles, however, emerged and peaked during the colonial period. *Jago* only existed in central and east Java. Similar groups in other regions definitely existed. Nonetheless, they had particular names. Some authors have incorrectly addressed similar groups as *jago.* For instance, in Greater Jakarta area, the term *jawara* was used, instead of *jago.*[76] *Jago* were more than simple rural criminals,[77] they were known mostly for their role as power brokers. The term *jago* is also frequently confused with *jagoan* (tough men). Indonesians may call present strongmen as *jagoan,* instead of *jago. Jago* is an adjective or noun to identify someone as being tough (in fighting) or smart (in science), for instance. Groups or an individual who act like *jago* are mostly called *jagoan.* This term has both positive and negative connotations. Although it seems unimportant, identifying a particular group with other names may be misleading and may lead to misunderstanding. Therefore, what I discuss here is the *jago* groups who roamed and settled in colonial Java.

In East Java *jago* found a comfortable haven, often acting as power brokers. They were also known as *patang, kebayan, weri* or *btater.* They were usually leaders of a peer group. Occasionally, a *patang* could surpass the charisma of a village headman. This charisma also extended to the population at large as well.[78] *Patang,* however, did not enjoy their time of power for a long time. When the colonial administration ended *Cuhuurstdsd* (cultivation system) in 1870, the authorities removed *patang* from their previous function as agents for corvee labor. The function was replaced by *weri* who were employed by the Dutch administration to

provide information to them. *Weri* thus acted as spies giving information about what was happening in villages. For the villagers, *weri* were called *blater* and this group numbered around 4,000 to 5,000 at the beginning of the twentieth century only in Madiun residency.[79]

Jago in their simplest form could also be criminals. Bands of robbers usually were led by a strong and *sakti* (magical power-possessing) boss. This headman formed an underworld network with other leaders of the similar groups. The networks as well as the bands were relatively loose in structure with individuals centered on the leader. The followers were hardly considered *jago* since there was only one *'jagoan'* in a gang though networks of *jago* were structurally common. These individuals or *anak buah* (underlings) could move to other gangs and took an oath to be faithful and serve their new leader if the old gang was disbanded or the leader was captured or if they were convinced that the new group could provide them with more opportunities. Patronage was thus exceptionally evident within these bands. The leader preserved his position by dispensing material rewards to leading members of the group. Personal links between *anak buah* and the leader could exist and were characterized by a large degree of dependencies on the assistance of the leader to the *anak buah.*

Like the notorious bandit Pitung in Batavia, *jago* were not righteous thugs. *Jago,* when they committed crime with their bands, did not rob from the well-off and instead distribute the booties to the unfortunate. Farmers or peasants in general, were easy prey for criminal bands. Cattle rustlings were quite common in Pasuruan, for instance. In 1909 there were 1382 cattle rustlings, while the number dropped off to 778 in 1914, 189 in 1919 and only 63 in 1924.[80] The number continuously declined for one possible reason. Sugarcane (tebu) estates were introduced by Chinese landlords who leased the land from various regents since the last decade of eighteenth century. One of these Chinese entrepreneurs was Han Kik Ko (1766-1813), the fifth son of Captain Han Bwee Kong whose estate around 1808 was including twelve villages and 2.538 persons.[81] During the heyday of the estates, a considerable number of people earned money by renting their cattle-carts to the estates as their means of livelihood. The abundance of cattle attracted bands of robbers to operate in Pasuruan. The development of transportation at the onset of the twentieth century, however, reduced the significance of cattle-carts. Consequently, cattle rustlings became less common.[82]

In another form of crime, *jago* might commit various forms of extortion. Even though fairly loose in structure, the *jago* bands had their own territory with a hierarchy of leaders and sponsors and characterized by

a distinct specializations of functions. Meetings in amusement centres, such as opium dens, prostitution quarters or simply *warung* (food stalls) served as means of discussion of their plans. They arranged operations of extortion. *Jago* were aware that the colonial authority was unable to penetrate in the lowest level of administration, the village. Daendels had created a centralistic government. All government affairs were arranged from Batavia. The colonial government based the administrative mechanism on a Western model, placing sultans and their families under the Dutch colonial government, and converting them into bureaucrats. Daendels's purpose was to run the government under direct rule, so that he could rule the people without the local rulers as intermediary. Nevertheless, the effect of this policy was not great. After the Daendels era, or more precisely after the Java war, the Dutch colonial government seemed to look back to indigenous people to run lower administrative areas where the indigenous administrative system relied on personal relations. The village became the lowest administrative unit, and was headed by a chief paid with a plot of village land. During such an indirect rule, *jago* offered 'protection' to a certain village. As a result, the village was safe from cattle rustlings or ordinary robberies. This protection was not free and indicates the most notorious form of extortion committed by *jago.*

As extortionists, *jago* also commit the crime in a more soft and elegant way. They would not undertake any misdeeds in a certain village and in fact would 'protect' the neighborhood against robberies. This offer once again was not for free. In exchange, they received exemption from taxes. For being guardians, they were admired by the people.[83] Not surprisingly, since they knew many of these defenseless elements of villagers, a number of *jago* could manage to become village heads by utilizing their role as the village guardians. Consequently, those villages were taken control by new generations of *jago* who benefited from the situation.

Jago might also act as power brokers or intermediaries for there were increasing demands for such persons at all levels of society. Intermediaries appeared between cultural ideals and the political realities of governing a society, bridging an ideological gap. The aristocracy's ideal, and that of all formal power holders in Java, was one of a symbolic center, protective, passive and aloof from day-to-day affairs. Just as the demands of the Dutch and the aristocracies could not be fulfilled without active intermediaries, as they lacked personnel, the peasantry also saw a need for more active leadership in order to link them with the outer world. This was found in the *jago.* Relative distance from the formal focus of power gave intermediaries less need for charisma, and more scope for direct action. An

intermediary is well illustrated in Groneman · s Een *Ketjoegeschiedenis.* The intermediary is portrayed not only, for instance, as being wealthier than a village head, but also more than an ordinary thief. He is fully aware of what he is doing since he is respected by the villagers.[84]

When they acted as brokers, *jago* normally operated against the population and they succeeded in spreading fear among the local inhabitants in colonial Java.[85] Regents in Java had to come to an agreement with *jago* in their territory. As a result, *jago* in this way became the spies of the regents in their area and they would not be afraid to accept the role of the strong arm of the law. *Jago* were almost always useful as spies[86] and collaborators of regents. Therefore, they succeeded in remaining outside the reach of European administration and creating their own power base in the shadow of the colonial state.[87]

Jago might learn *pencak silat* (martial arts) with certain *guru.* It is also possible that they knew a few simple Arabic words. In Pekalongan, there were many kiai in the rural areas who were *sakti* and were able to transfer the ilmu, reflecting the strong magic-religious elements in rural Islam.[88] Lenggaong in Pekalongan, Brebes and Tegal were deeply involved in the rural revolution in October 1945. They were to a large degree tied to Islam.[89] Elsewhere, militia groups in the Greater Batavia area also mastered *pencak silat* skills, including *ilmu kanuragan* (invulnerability). Unlike common *jago* who were not *dukun* (magicians/shamans/healers), these revolutionaries could also created *jimat* with the same amount of *kesaktian.*

The colonial administration was concerned with the increasing roles of the *jago.* Batavia, for instance sent Snouck Hurgronje to Madiun to investigate a case involving the regent, Brotodiningrat. Snouck found several leaders of the *jago,* among them *kiai* and *dukun.* According to Snouck all these prominent *jago* had the reputation of being *kebal* (invulnerable) and taught others the means to achieve invulnerability. Although it would be hard to prove their involvement in any subversive designs of the regent of Madiun, or of any crime, Snouck advised the government to exile the most prominent *jago.* According to Snouck they had the reputation of being fearless even against higher Dutch authority and being *kebal* against bullets and sharp weapons. If the Netherlands East Indies government did not take measures against them, then their reputation of being magically invulnerable would be enhanced and lead to more unrest.[90] *Jago* frequently gained their reputation from the fear he inspired in the local populations. Once he had proven his power, people would not dare to oppose his hasty reputation. For the official regional rulers *jago* were the prime instrument to reinforce their grip on their

district. Thus, besides the official hierarchy of local rulers, an indispensable informal circuit operated, in which *jago* operated as agent for the higher authorities.[91]

The inability to strengthen the colonial administration at the local level and the geographic isolation of life in the countryside created an administrative vacuum in which the *jago* guild established' itself. The intimidation and violence that emanated from this network turned itself primarily against its own people who, in order to avoid a fate worse than death, decided it was better to buy off the threat. Furthermore, although officially *jago* were considered to have played only a marginal role, in reality they engaged in a more significant role at the centre of local life, utilizing the space provided by the central government, and filling it with violence. Local violence was part of an almost steady tradition in Java since, until recently, no central administration had the power to control society completely.[92]

E. *Jawara:* Feared and Admired Champions

Tubagus Chasan Sochib, we first encountered in the beginning of our discussion, was unquestionably the most influential and renowned *jawara* in Banten at the moment. As an old man (born in 1930), people may assume that he is an ordinary veteran. He is indeed a veteran in *jawara* world, entrepreneurship and a veteran in the sense that he comes from Generation 45, a generation that struggled in Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949. Ratu Atut Chosiyah, the former governor of the Banten Province is one of his daughters.

Perhaps the most influential strongmen in the socio-political world of Indonesia is *jawara.* The New Order administration provided them with opportunities to expand themselves into socio-political realms. *Era Reformasi,* often characterized by social instability and insecurity, even has placed the position of this group on a firm basis. *Jawara* have long entrenched themselves in Bantenese society. Like *jago,* the roots can be traced back to the colonial era. Unlike *jago,* however, *jawara* have strengthened their position in society.

Throughout history, *jawara* in Banten display a long continuity in the various roles they have played, from their mythical origins as bodyguards of kings and *ulama,* as instigators of rebellions, to their mobilization as security personnel for political parties and the ruling elite. Kartodirdjo argued that the *jawara* consisted largely of people without permanent occupation who were often engaged in criminal activities.[93] A report from a Dutch resident, Craemer, in his *memorie van overgave* of 1930s,

told us that *jawara* originally evolved from *orok lanjang,* a youth organization in the district of Menes. This organization then developed, spreading outside Menes and becoming a bodyguard organization that was notorious for being involved in fighting and stirring up trouble.[94]

Jawara were thought to be the pupils of *kiai. Kiai* in Banten not only taught Islamic religious learning, but also gave martial arts as one of the lessons. Pupils who were more talented in practicing martial arts became known as *jawara.* Even though they left the *pesantren* after they graduated, they still considered the *kiai* as their teachers.[95] Perhaps that is why a considerable number of *jawara* believed that they are the *khadam* (servant) of kiai.

The close relationship between *jawara* and *ulama* (religious leaders) was crucial throughout the late nineteenth century, when revolts against the Dutch colonial government erupted throughout Banten, and again during the struggle for independence. Both were central figures in village life. The relationship between them was at times troubled, as *jawara,* to a large extent represented pre-Islamic traditions sometimes considered to be at odds with Islam.[96] Between them, there were also intermediaries known as *ulama jawara.* This term could be applied either to *jawara* who established themselves as religious teachers, or to *ulama* who mastered martial arts. In either case such figures played an important role as mediating cultural brokers.[97]

Moreover, both *jawara* and ulama *jawara* in the vast network of *pesantren* were also influential in the spread of martial arts. Perhaps martial arts in Banten are closely intertwined with the life of *tarekat.* In some cases *jawara* joined *tarekat* as part of a sincere spiritual quest. Nevertheless, more commonly *tarekat* and the techniques that they were taught were means toward obtaining the various kinds of esoteric knowledge that were considered essential for success as *jawara.* Similarly, some martial arts teachers conducted *tarekat* type communal devotions.[98]

According to Hudaeri, *jawara* played roles mainly with leadership aspects, such as becoming *jaro (lurah/village* head), *jagakersa* (penjaga keamanan desa/village security), martial arts teachers, and teachers of magic.[99] The *jaro* figures who first appeared during the reign of the Sultanate, still existed in recent days. Certainly, during the New Order Era, these figures were well known for their leadership in mobilizing local villagers to vote for the ruling party in general elections. It is interesting to note that many *jawara* often took some verses from Quran, and thus they believed that the power they had originally came from *kiai* and that the

power as well as the *jawara* themselves were considered 'white'.[100] Nonetheless, I argue that this view is somewhat incorrect since both a considerable number of 'white' and 'black' *jawara* have used black magic up to the present day.

The emergence of *jawara* was not a result of oppression and grinding poverty in Banten. Though they may have joined in spontaneous food riots, or may have committed criminal acts, people facing starvation are too busy just surviving to plot the overthrow of government or to formulate a blueprint for an alternative social order. The emergence of the *jawara* supports this proposition and the assertion that the potential for violent social protest corresponds to relative rather than absolute deprivation. *Jawara* groups who were considered to be bandits were reduced to starvation or to total impoverishment; they suffered a significant decline in their social standing and economic well being.

Moreover, their relationship with the rural population was ambiguous, as can be seen in the ambiguity of the *jawara* figure in the folk etymology (which can also be considered to be an abbreviation) of the words: *jghat* (evil), wani (brave), *rampog* (robber) and *iago* (champion), wani, (brave), and *ramah* (friendly). Else Ensering classified *jawara* into two groups: the *jawara-teri,* in reference to petty thieves and robbers, and the *jawara-gecleh,* who practice *pencak silat* (martial arts), use weapons, and pursue mystical development under the guidance of a kiai, culminating in obtaining invulnerability.[101]

In Banten, ulama and *jawara* were co-opted into the political machines of Golkar. The recognition of ulama by the governing party was manifested by the establishment of Satkar Ulama (Satuan Karya Ulama · the Ulama Work Squad) in 1971, while *jawara* were organised into Satkar Pendekar (Satuan Karya Pendekar · the Martial Art Work Squad) in 1972. By entering the state and adjusting to the new atmosphere of the political situation, they created new positions where they gradually expanded their power, status and wealth.

The patron-client relationships in Banten in the New Order Era perhaps were best identified in the ties between the state and *jawara.* Throughout history, *jawara* had always worked individually or in small bands. Whilst there were informal networks of individual *jawara,* usually based upon allegiances and loyalties to particular ulama, there had never been a formal structured organization. Satkar Pendekar, renamed Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan clan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia (PPPSBBl-the Indonesian Association of Bantenese Men of Martial Arts, Art and Culture), was established as a forum for *jawara* and martial arts schools

throughout Banten as well as those in Jakarta. From its inception PPPSBBI identified 'nation and state' with Golkar, with whom they had had a close relationship since the 1977 general election. lt was largely due to the influence of Tubagus Chasan Sochib who, since the early 1970s, was a local parliamentarian for the Golkar faction, and certainly a prominent figure in the *1awara* commumty.[102]

Sochib was born in Serang in 1930. He has three brothers, Tubagus Basuni, Tubagus Syatibi and Entus Sibli, and one sister, Ojah Faojah. They are all children of Tubagus Sochib and Nyi Ratu Rofiah. He attended several *pesantren* during his childhood. Of the pesantren, the Pesantren Pani·is in Jiput, Pandeglang was his first boarding school. His parents entrusted him to Kiai Cholil. During his stay, he showed braveness and intelligence, an attitude that would benefit his future career in many areas of society. In the revolutionary era, Sochib went to Pesantren Cadasari, under the guidance of Kiai lcot. Shortly after the acceptance to that *pesantren,* he joined Hisbullah, a guerrilla warfare unit, whose commanders were Kiai Abdullah and Ayip Samin. After the revolutionary period came to an end, he embarked upon a more serious working life in 1967 (after a couple of years dealing with a number of small businesses) by providing logistical support to the Kodam Siliwangi. Two years later he founded a construction company, PT Sinar Ciomas Raya, which frequently won government tenders for road and market construction projects. His involvement spread to the Krakatau Steel State Company, and to tourism and real estate, while holding key positions in associations, such as the Regional and Central Chambers of Commerce and Trade (Kadin) and the Indonesian National Contractors· Association (Gapensi), putting his men on their local executive committees.[103]

The position of Sochib in the PPPSBBI as chairman is the peak of his vertical mobility. That he was a *kepala kuli* (chief labourer) and then gained a more respectable status by becoming an entrepreneur showed this mobility. After he had reached the top, he moved horizontally, increasing his social mobility. Even though PPPSBBI is not a wing organization of Golkar, the organization was essential in the political context of Golkar. Golkar was a crucial and strategic element for Sochib expanding his horizontal mobility. As a man with power-both social power and power through violence-through Golkar he had a wide sphere to increase his political access. To strengthen his domination in Golkar, he placed *jawara* as cadres in the organization with the banyan tree as its symbol. These cadres held several important positions at the district and municipal levels. Apparently, those who had had experience as local officials were favored by

him. However, according to Suhaedi, to be actively engaged in Golkar was not his choice in career, although in reality he was a member of the advisory board. For Sochib, Golkar was an instrument to expand and secure his business, not mainly a tool to obtain political power.[104] Therefore, through Kadin and Gapensi, Sochib could control the companies operated in Banten, due to the fact that certifications from Kadin and Gapensi were necessary for government procurement. Sochib utilized this to coordinate projects in Banten and the coordination brought him more money. Another side to this situation is that it led *jawara* under his control to become his (sub) contractors and receive a share of his profits.[105]

I would argue that the PPPSBBI was the first organization to spread his power in the political constellation, and that the political constellation was the vehicle introducing him to a bigger business world than he had moved in before. One of the main purposes of the establishment of the PPPSBBI was to channel the aspirations of *jawara* away from self-interest and criminality towards more ·constructive· activities, that contributed to the New Order· s program of social and economic development. Encompassing over 70 *perguruan* and debus groups, by the mid 1990s the organization claimed a membership of 170,000. In the words of Sochib, 'in the past *jawara* only fought for themselves, their group or tribe, however via the PPPSBBI together we fight for the nation and the state'. Commonly known as *jawara pembangunan* (development *jawara),* they worked to ensure Golkar's supremacy. Taking advantage of the long-standing influence of *jawara* in village life, Golkar, through the General Ali Murtopo, utilized PPPSBBI to secure support for the party in Banten. In addition, as the general chairman of the *pendekar*[106] organization and one of the executive committee members of Satkar Ulama, Sochib could act as bridge between the military, bureaucracy and Golkar, as well as the informal world of Banten.[107]

Another prominent *jawara* figure in Bantenese society is Maman Rizal. Like many other *jawara,* after mastering martial arts, he went to Jakarta to gain better chances for his livelihood. In 1967 he began his political career by entering Sekber Golkar and later, in 1970, joined the MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong - The Mutual Assistance Families Society), a wing organization of Golkar. After returning to Banten, he became a member of the Pandeglang branch of Golkar. In Pandeglang he was appointed Ketua Divisi Pemenangan Pemilu clan Pengkaderan (the Head of Winning the General Election and Forming of Cadres Division or simply the Success Team) in 1987-1988. His wide network, encompassing other *jawara* with many followers, was a basic

reason for him to hold several important positions in Golkar. Therefore, his influence was seen as an essential factor for his position in Golkar. In addition, he also served as treasurer of MKGR from 1975 until 1987. His political career in Golkar gradually improved with his appointment as treasurer of the Serang branch of Golkar, from 1988-2000. For Rizal, Golkar had political and economical benefits that formed a structural base for broadening his power. As an entrepreneur, he has become involved in many government-financed projects. Meanwhile, in the *jawara* world, he is now a leading figure in the Kebudayaan Seni Tari clan Silat Indonesia Tjimande Tari Kolot Kebon Ojeruk Hilir (Kesti TTKKDH-the Indonesian Dancing and Martial Arts Tjimande Tari Kolot Kebon Djeruk Hilir Association). This organization is widely known among the Bantenese, and thus facilitates spreading the organization to villages. Consequently, Kesti TTKKDH contributed to the victories of Golkar during the New Order era's general elections. Golkar, however, rendered a service bestowing members of the organization positions in the local parliament, as well as conferring big favors on them to help them become successful entrepreneurs. Like Sochib, the economical aspect is a main reason behind his activities. [108]

The fall of Suharto in 1998 led to changes in the *jawara* world. Okamoto Masaaki has emphasized the significance of *jawara* roles in Pilkada Banten 2006 (the 2006 Direct Election of Governor of Banten). In bringing about the victory of Ratu Atut Chosiyah, *jawara* groups under the leadership of Sochib made use various means to bring this *jawara-like* strong minded and confident woman to become the first female governor of Banten. The various methods ranging from publicizing the results of two polls conducted by Lembaga Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Institute) and Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Circle) to intervening in Golkar·s regional convention on 2 July 2006 as well as performing the same actions in PDI-P' s special regional working meeting on 5 April 2006 (the result is that Atut became the sole candidate for the governor seat from the two major parties). They also capitalized on voters' materialism (ranging from *jualrbeli suara*/sell-buy votes before the election day until executing *serangan fajar-dawn* attack/the buying of votes at dawn on the election day), utilising PPPSBBI and Badan Pembina Potensi Keluarga Besar Banten (BPPKB - the Agency to Develop the Potentialities of the Bantenese), and co-opted young intellectuals, such as activists from Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI - Islamic Students· Association), Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII - Indonesian Islam Student Movement) and Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI - National Committee for Indonesian

Youth).[109] The last strategy actually mirrored the tactics that Golkar used during the Suharto administration in gaining victories during general elections.

F. *Preman:* The Present Free Men

Nowadays, perhaps the most well known group I discuss in this paper is *preman.* Elderly people who were aware of what was happening in their daily life before 1990s might not expect that the term *preman* would have a different meaning. The term initially referred to a policeman or a soldier who did not wear his uniform or in other words, he was in his civilian dress *(berpakaian preman).* The opposite of it is *berpakaian dinas* (wearing uniform). The term also assumed another meaning; *preman* meant something in personal ownership, not belonged to the state, such as *mobil preman* (private car) and thus the opposite is *mobil dinas* or *mobil pemerintah* (state's car or government's car). Consequently, when Van der Kroef in 1985 spoke about Petrus killings *(penembakan misterius* or *penembak* misterius/mysterious shooting or mysterious rifleman), he did not mention any single word of *'preman'.* He proposed that the targets were *bromocorah* or *gali-gali/gali (gabungan anak-anak liar,* literally means gangs of wild kids).[110] Other accounts after 1990 also mentioned the term *gali* for the victims.[111] If Petrus occurred after 1990s, the victims have called *'preman'.*

Since *jago* were considered as 'local hero', 'power brokers', 'criminals' or 'people who posses invulnerability and master martial arts'[112], *preman* may only inherit 'criminal' aspects of the *jago.* People like Yapto Soerjosoemarno and Yorrys Raweyai through Pemuda Pancasila organization (PP - Pancasila Youth), however, may also inherit 'power brokers' aspects of the *jago* due to the fact that they could become the bridge between the Suharto government in order to secure his power through supporting Golkar and the expectation of the *preman* of PP to fulfill its mission to raise their welfare.[113]

If *jago* were the grandfather of *preman,*[114] then *gali* may be the father of *preman. Gali* were recognized by their tattoos. In fact, this distinguished between *orang biasa* (commoners) and *penjahat* (criminals) or *residivis* (recidivists) during the Petrus time. *Gali* were petty criminals. They could be active criminals, ex-convicts or recidivists. *Gali* were, however, history. By the time Petrus ended in 1985, *gali* also came to an end. Ryter suggests two differences between *gali* and preman. First, *gali* was a collective phenomenon: the threat was that of roving gangs. *Preman,* meanwhile, can stand as lone figures. Second, in contrast with the sense that *gali* were

understood to be unruly and unauthorized, the term *preman* has retained a quasi-official ring.[115] I, however, would argue that despite their name, *'gabungan'* (gang), a *gali* could also stand as a lone figure. Not only that the death squads who killed the *gali* only killed them one by one during the operation, and thus not kill a whole group, but also, more importantly, the authorities did not distinguish them whether they belonged to a particular group or operated alone.[116] Preman, though can stand as a lone figure; have to rely strongly on other people. If they lack protection, they remain 'lonely wolves to be quickly dispatched'.[117] PP members, for instance, needed to offer services to the authorities not only that they expected to get something in return, such as being able to control revenues generated in the informal economy, especially parking and the management of informal traders,[118] but also they needed protection from the state in order to survive.

Gali, as we know them mostly from Petrus, could bequeath their tough characteristic to *preman.* This inheritance has been made possible due to the fact that *preman* and the state need each other. Under Suharto regime, for instance, *perdekkingan* or *perbekkingan* (the backing system) was extremely common. The state, usually through the police and armed forces made use of *preman* groups to secure their private businesses. These businesses range from BUMN (Badan Usaha Milik Negara/state-owned company), cooperatives and foundations, non-institutionalised businesses carried out by ex-high officials of the police and armed forces, until private institutions that affiliate themselves with the police and armed forces. In exchange, *preman* groups not only could survive, but more significantly, they were financially supported by these state officials[119] State premanisme, like Tim Lindsey has suggested was the nature of the New Order. Furthermore, he argues that under Suharto, power was equivalent to wealth. It was secured through violence, and centered on the elite that were equivalent to the state itself. To secure this equivalence the New Order created a parallel 'secret' state to ensure the elite access to illegal or extra legal funds, and thus it was through this system that business and administration were really carried out. Moreover, rival criminal 'gang' structures linked the political and the business elite through the military to *preman,* which sometimes mutated into private armies or militias linked to political and business leaders.[120] This system permeated every aspect of public life under the New Order, from contracting, to law enforcement, to narcotics, to public transport. In simple words, it was a system by which *preman* having collected *japrem* (illegal rents), in turn pay setoran (rents) to state officials, in return for the right to operate.[121] I, however, believe that Lindsey's view suggesting that the state's attitude to and use of criminal violence can be tracked down to

the revolutionary period is somewhat incorrect. I have already discussed about the roots of violence in the previous pages.

Preman in Jakarta are organized along ethnic lines into permanent gangs which control clearly demarcated territories.[122] This also holds true for many other big cities in Indonesia. In Surabaya, Madurese and Javanese have always fought over territory in Tanjung Perak. In Bandung, preman from Priangan area, mostly from Garut, and Banten have constantly clashed in Cicaheum or Alun-alun area.

Like *jago, weri,* opium farm *mata-mata* (spy), all in central and east Java,[123] *preman*·s main business is extortion. The extortion range from asking money in the street acting as private traffic-controller police *(pak ogah-the* targets are people driving their car and mostly public transport drivers); controlling parking places; protecting pickpockets in markets, terminals, stations and other public places; until being in charge of gambling industry, massage parlors, discotheques and other entertainment centers. From the most simple until the most complicated methods, *preman* always need other parties to survive. All operations have to be executed smoothly; otherwise the police will become involved. Even if the police find out about it, there are always ways to solve the problem. The boss of the *preman* can always negotiate it with the official apparatus, by contributing an amount of money. consequently, *japrem* that become *preman's* resources will finally turn into the officials' incomes. Although the methods of operating vary from city to city, however, this pattern is extremely common in Indonesia and seems to be able to reinforce after the New Order collapsed.

G. Conclusion

Violence is a cultural category, a historically developed form of construction. The view on violence is always bounded with time and place and is largely depended on those involved in it, whether they are the offenders and victims, spectators and bystanders or witnesses and authorities. Bullfight in Spain that for most people anywhere in the world is a fight, is not considered a fight in Spain, but rather as show called *corrida de taros* (the running of bulls).124 Daily crimes are changing and classifications and definitions that embody the crimes are not static either and thus we should consider violence as a cultural form of construction. Street robberies were considered for a long time as thefts, but were recently redefined as violent delicts. In former days, violence against individuals, including murder, was considered less dreadful and for instance punished less severely than crimes against property. Today, the law considers violence against individuals as a more serious delict than crimes against property.[125]

It is in this sense that the violent aspects of the strongmen groups I have discussed are not always considered as uncontaminated violence. Like headhunting, running amok or *carok* that are considered as actions of expressing ways of ritualistic behaviors, ultimate vindication of honor and simply the messages people want to convey, rather than performing pointless violence; rampok-bandits when robbed, *jago* when bridged the underworld and upper-world, *jawara* when capitalized on voters' materialism, or *preman* when extorted, cannot be simply regarded as carrying out meaningless violence. Their violent deeds indeed have reflected the time and place and more importantly the society where they originate. All the four strongmen groups are in fact able to employ their power since the society where they come from have helped maintaining their existence. Nevertheless, the society cannot be pointed out as the sole party for the endurance of these strongmen groups. It is indeed the authorities, from the pre-colonial era to the present day who have made use of these covert powers, who can be mainly regarded as the defenders and protectors of these strongmen groups in Indonesia.

These strongmen groups have demonstrated a variety of roles, from agents of protection to their leading roles as power brokers. The origin of these strongmen groups is not fully understood. It seems that it is a relatively new phenomenon (perhaps older than a hundred years) and the emergence of these strongmen groups in each area may show parallel patterns with other groups of strongmen in the Archipelago.

Whether they become power brokers or criminals, they are outlaws, in the sense that the authorities do not wish to touch them. They can make allies with criminals, but they can also cooperate with local administrations. Everything depends on the demands. They are needed by local authorities to maintain peace and order, but they will almost definitely collaborate with criminals if there are big targets and easy prey. Nevertheless, they mostly make allies with local authorities as their means of livelihood. During the colonial period, these local authorities who lost their privileges became their main allies. Since there were a significant number of local authorities who lost their privileges, not surprisingly, bands of these people could grow and expand their territory and allied with local authorities (as described by C. Amand). Certainly, to facilitate the coordination between them, these strongmen created their own networks (as described by Boeka). By establishing these loose networks, their position became stronger and complicated and thus created complex condition for colonial authorities to eradicate them. Here we witness that these groups were made possible to establish and develop due to the weak policies of the colonial

administration to accommodate the interests of local and indigenous authorities. These processes did not occur at once, but gradually and indicated a strong tendency when colonial authorities' policies failed to facilitate indigenous people to create strong-based economy and were deteriorated due to the absence of strict laws that allowed illegal and violent practices happen in society.

Unlike *jago* who sustained to practice their business untouched well into the 1930s, as long as the manifestation of 'law and order' was not openly disrupted, *jawara* have continued their business up to present day. In collaboration with and protected by local officials, *jawara* have succeeded in spreading the fear in Banten, where they have formed an unstable system of internally shifting power relationships which challenged the formal structures of the state. They are what we call the shadow state.[126] *Preman* who emerged later, have also exercised the same pattern of *jawara* in Banten. The ongoing state formation, such as democratization and decentralization allow new emergences of politically autonomous local leaders. This process seems to enable or-in fact-to maintain a number of deep-rooted social groups which use violence and intimidation as their ways of reaching their goals, to continue spreading their socio-economic and political influences.

Endnotes:

[1] Laboratorium Bantenologi IAIN "Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin" Banten, Indonesia

[2] Wessel, Ingrid. ·Introduction·, in Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (Eds), *Violence* in *Indonesia,* Hamburg: Abera, 2001, pp. 8-14.

[3] Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence· , in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of Violence* in *Indonesia: Contemporary Violence* in Historical *Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 33-61.

[4] Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), 'Introduction·, in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of Violence* in *Indonesia: Contemporary Violence* in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 1-31.

[5] Dijk, Kees van. ·The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, Explaining the Unexplainable: *Amuk Massa* in Indonesia· , in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of Violence* in *Indonesia: Contemporary Violence* in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 277-297.

[6] Heryanto, Ariel. State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging, London: Routledge, 2006.

[7] Schulte Nordholt, Henk ·The *Jago* in the Shadow: Crime and ·Order· in the Colonial State in Java·, in RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, pp. 74-91; Schulte Nordholt, Henk and Marg reet van Till, ·Colonial Criminals in Java, 1870-1910, in Vicente L. Rafael (Ed), *Figures of Criminality* in *Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam,* Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Prog ram, 1999; and Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence·, in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of Violence* in Indonesia: *Contemporary Violence* in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 33-61.

[8] Emmerson, Donald K. *Indonesia's* Elite: *Political Culture and Cultural Politics,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976, p. 40; Rush, James R. *Opium* to Java: *Revenue* Farming *and Chinese Enterprise* in *Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990, pp. 14-15; and Lev, Daniel S. 'The Criminal Regime: Criminal Process in Indonesia· , in Vicente L. Rafael (Ed), *Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial* Vietnam, Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1999.

[9] Siegel, James T. ·A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: the Nationalization of "Death",· in Rafael, Vicente L. (Ed.), *Figures of Criminality* in Indonesia, *the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam,* Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 1999, pp. 210-230.

[10] Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence· , in Colombijn, F eek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), Roots *of Violence in* Indonesia: *Contemporary Violence* in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, p. 39.

[11] Colombijn, Freek. 'What is so Indonesian about Violence?·, in Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (Eds), *Violence* in Indonesia, Hamburg: Abera, 2001, p. 26.

[12] Cribb, Robert. ·Legal Pluralism, Decentralisation and the Roots of Violence in Indonesia· , in Dewi Fortuna Anwar et al (Ed.), *Violent Internal* Conflicts in *Asia Pacific: Histories, Political Economies* and *Policies,* Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005, p. 44.

[13] Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Peace Index: 2010 Methodology, Results and* Findings, Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010.

[14] Colombijn, Freek. ·What is so Indonesian about Violence?·, in Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (Eds), *Violence in* Indonesia, Hamburg: Abera, 2001, pp. 27-29.

[15] Milton, Giles. *Nathaniel's Nutmeg: How One Man·s Resolve Changed the World,* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1999.

[16] Nas, Peter J.M. and Pratiwo, ·Java and De Groote Postweg, La Grande Route, the Great Mail Road, Jalan Raya Pos·, in *BKI,* 2002, No. 4, pp. 707-725.

[17] Kartodirdjo, Sartono. *Protest Movements* in *Rural lava:* A *Study of Agrarian Unrest in the. Nineteenth* and *early* Twentieth *Centuries,* Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 5 and Kartodirdjo, Sartono, *The* Peasants· *Revolt of* Ban*ten* in *1888, Its* Conditions, *Course, and Sequel:* A *Case Study of Social Movements* in *Indonesia,* ·s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 140-141.

[18] Kartodirdjo, Sartono. ·Ag rarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development·, in Holt, Claire (Ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 89-90.

[19] Pribadi, Yanwar. *Jawara* in *Banten: Their Socio-Political Roles* in the *New Order Era 1966-1998,* M.A. Thesis, Leiden University, 2008, pp. 15-16.

[20] Smail, John R. W. *Bandung* in *the Early Revolution, 1945-1946:* A *Study* in *the Social History of the* Indonesian Revolution, Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1964.

[21] Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Java* in *a* Time *of Revolution: Occupation* and Resistance, *1944-1946,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972.

[22] Reid, Anthony. *The Blood of the People: Revolution* and *the* End *of Traditional Rule* in Northern *Sumatra,* Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979.

[23] Lucas, Anthony Edward. *The Bamboo Spear* Pierces *the Payung: The Revolution* Against *the Bureaucratic* Elite in *N0lrth Central lava* in 1945, PhD Thesis, Canberra: Australian National Univers.ity, 1981.

[24] Robinson, Geoffrey. ·State, Society and Political Conflict in Bali 1945-1946·, in Indonesia, Vol. 45 (1988), pp. 1-48.

[25] Cribb, Robert. Gangsters and *Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People·s* Militia and *the* Indonesian *Revolution 1945-1949,* North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1991.

[26] Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. Imagined Communities: Reflections on *the* Origins *and Spread of Nationalism,* London: Verso, 1991, p. 6.

[27] Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence·, in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), Roots *of* Violence in Indonesia: *Contemporary* Violence in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, p. 52.

[28] Cribb, Robert. *Gangsters* and *Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People·s Militia* and *the* Indonesian *Revolution 1945-1949,* North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1991, p. 2.

[29] Smith, Anthony D. *National* Identity, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991, p. 21.

[30] Anderson, Benedict R. o·G. *lava* in *a Time of Revolution: Occupation* and Resistance, *1944-1946,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 70-71.

[31] Smail, John R. W. Bandung in *the Early Revolution, 1945-1946:* A *Study* in *the Social History of the* Indonesian *Revolution,* Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1964, pp. 54-55 and 156.

[32] Wulfften Palthe, P. M. van (a). *Over het Bendewezen op Java,* Amsterdam: Van Rossen, 1949, pp. 7-8.

[33] Wulfften Palthe, P. M. van (a). *Over het Bendewezen op Java,* Amsterdam: Van Rossen, 1949, pp. 14-15.

[34] Cribb, Robert. *Gangsters* and *Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People·s Militia* and *the* Indonesian *Revolution 1945-1949,* North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1991, pp. 38-39.

[35] Cribb, Robert. *Gangsters* and *Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People·s Militia* and *the* Indonesian *Revolution 1945-1949,* North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1991, p. 54.

[36] Smith, Anthony D. "Nations and History," in M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson (Eds.), Understanding *Nationalism,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 9-31.

[37] Robinson, Geoffrey. ·State, Society and Political Conflict in Bali 1945-1946·, in lndonesia, Vol. 45 (1988), pp. 1-48.

[38] Eklof, Stephan. ·The 1965-1966 Killings in Bali: Historical and Cultural Approaches·, in Husken, Frans and Huub de Jonge (Eds.), *Violence* and *Vengeance:* Discontent and Conf1ict in *New Order* lndonesia, Saarbrucken: Verlag for Entwicklungspolitik Saarbrucken, 2002, pp. 124-125.

[39] Heryanto, Ariel. State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging, London: Routledge, 2006.

[40] Cribb, Robert. ·Legal Pluralism, Decentralisation and the Roots of Violence in Indonesia·, in Dewi Fortuna Anwar et al (Ed.), Violent *Internal Conflicts* in *Asia Pacific: Histories, Political* Economies *and Policies,* Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005, pp. 41-57. Vigilantism here refers to a situation in which local communities became accustomed to autonomy in identifying and punishing crime. See Cribb, 'Legal Pluralism, 2005: 57.

[41] Cribb, Robert. ·From Total People·s Defence to Massacre: Explaining Indonesian Military Violence in East Timor·, in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of* Violence in *Indonesia: Contemporary Violence* fn *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 230.

[42] Schulte Nordholt, Henk ·Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency and Identity in Post-Soeharto Indonesia·, in *BKI,* Vol. 159, No. 4, 2003, p. 575.

[43] Schulte Nordholt, Henk ·The *Jago* in the Shadow: Crime and ·Order· in the Colonial State in Java·, in RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, pp. 74-91; Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence·, in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of Violence* in *Indonesia: Contemporary* Violence in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 33-61.; and Schulte Nordholt, Henk and Margreet van Till, ·Colonial Criminals in Java, 1870-1910, in Vicente L. Rafael (Ed), *Figures of* Criminality in *Indonesia,* the *Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam,* Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1999.

[44] Hobsbawm, E.J. *Primitive Rebels: Studies* in *Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959, pp. 1-29.

[45] Hobsbawm, Eric. *Bandits,* New York: Delacorte Press, 1969.

[46] Hobsbawm, Eric. *Bandits,* New York: Delacorte Press, 1969, p. 15.

[47] Hobsbawm, E. J. ·Social Banditry·, in Henry A. Landsberger (Ed.), *Rural* Protest: *Peasant Movements and Social Change,* London: Macmillan, 1974, p. 142.

[48] Hobsbawm, E.J. *Primitive Rebels: Studies* in *Archaic* Forms *of Social Movement* in *the 19th and 20th Centuries.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959; Hobsbawm, Eric. *Bandits,* New York: Delacorte Press, 1969; and Hobsbawm, E. J. ·Social Banditry", in Henry A. Landsberger (Ed.), *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change,* London: Macmillan, 1974, pp. 142-157.

[49] Hobsbawm, E. J. ·Social Banditry', in Henry A. Landsberger (Ed.), *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change,* London: Macmillan, 1974, pp. 143.

[50] Blok, Anton ·The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered·, in *Comparative Studies* in *Society and History,* Vol. 14, No. 4 (September 1972), p. 496 and Blok, Anton (a). ·Social Banditry Reconsidered·, in Anton Blok, *Honour and Violence,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 17, 20 and 22.

[51] Blok, Anton ·The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered·, in *Comparative Studies* in *Society and History,* Vol. 14, No. 4 (September 1972), p. 498 and Blok, Anton (a). ·Social Banditry Reconsidered·, in Anton Blok, *Honour and Violence,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p. 18.

[52] O'Malley, Pat. ·Social Bandits, Modern Capitalism and the Traditional Peasantry: A Critique of Hobsbawm·, in *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 6: 4 (1979), pp. 490.

[53] O'Malley, Pat. ·Social Bandits, Modern Capitalism and the Traditional Peasantry: A Critique of Hobsbawm·, in *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 6: 4 (1979), pp. 494-499.

[54] Hobsbawm, Eric. *Bandits,* New York: Delacorte Press, 1969, pp. 13-14.

[55] Cribb, Robert. *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949,* North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1991, pp. 18-19.

[56] Boeka (P.C.C. Hansen Jr.), *Pah Troeno,* Amsterdam: F van Rossen, 1901, pp. 38-43, 48, 86, 172, 310, 335 and 338.

[57] Schulte Nordholt, Henk 'The *Jago* in the Shadow: Crime and 'Order' in the Colonial State in Java', in RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, pp. 39 and 82.

[58] Poensen, C. *Brieven over den Islam uit de Binnenlanden van Java,* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1886, p. 163.

[59] Blok, Anton (c). 'Social Banditry Reconsidered', in Anton Blok, *Honour and* Violence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p. 29.

[60] Tihami, M. A., *Kiai dan Jawara di Banten: Studi tentang Agama, Magi, dan Kepemimpinan di Desa Pasanggrahan Serang, Banten.* MA Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 1992, pp. 99-100.

[61] Williams, Michael C. *Communism,* Religion *and Revolt* in *Banten,* Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1990, pp. 57-58.

[62] Kartodirdjo, Sartono, The *Peasants' Revolt of Banten* in *1888, Its* Conditions, *Course, and Sequel:* A *Case Study of Social Movements* in *Indonesia,* 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 54-57.

[63] Blok, Anton (c). 'Bandits ahd Boundaries: Robber Bands and Secret Societies on the Dutch Frontier (1730-1778), in Anton Blok, *Honour and Violence,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p. 33.

[64] Till, Margreet van. 'In Search of Si Pitung: The History of an Indonesian Legend', in *BKI* 152, No. 3, 1996, pp. 461-482.

[65] A military body charged with police duties among civilian populations (1837-1908).

[66] Wulfften Palthe, P. M. van (b), *Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian Problem,* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949, p. 27.

[67] Rush, James R. *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise* in *Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990, pp. 114-115.

[68] Onghokham (b), 'The Pulung-Affair: A Tax-Payers Revolt from Patik: Aspects of Nineteenth Century Rural Politics in Java', in Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands 19-22 May 1976, Leiden and Jakarta: Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1978, p. 72.

[69] Rush, James R. *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise* in *Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 116.

[70] Quinn, George. 'The Javanese Science of Burglary', in RIMA, 9, 1, January-June 1975: 33-54.

[71] Groneman, Isaac. *Een Ketjoegeschiedenis,* Dordrecht: J.P. Revers, 1887, pp. 194-195.

[72] Wulfften Palthe, P. M. van (b), *Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian Problem,* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949, pp. 27-28; Suhartono, *Bandit-bandit Pedesaan: Studi* Historis *1850-1942 di Jawa,* Yogyakarta: Aditya Media, 1995, p. 102; and Quinn, George. 'The Javanese Science of Burglary', in RIMA, 9, 1, January-June 1975: 33-54.

[73] Groneman, Isaac. *Een Ketjoegeschiedenis,* Dordrecht: J.P. Revers, 1887.

[74] Boeka (P.C.C. Hansen Jr.), *Poh* Troeno, Amsterdam: F van Rossen, 1901, pp. 39 and 88.

[75] Onghokham, ·The *Jago* in Colonial Java, Ambivalent Champion of the People·, in Andrew Turton and Shigeharu Tanabe (Eds.), *Histroy and Peasant Consciousness* in *South East Asia*, Osaka: Nationa.l Museum of Ethnology, 1984, pp. 335-336.

[76] Smail, John R. W. Bandung in *the Early Revolution, 1945-1946:* A *Study* in *the Social History* of *the* Indonesian Revolution, Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1964, p. 88; Cribb, Robert. *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People·* s *Militia and the* Indonesian Revolution *1945-1949*, North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1991, pp. 18-19; and Till, Margreet van. ·In Search of Si Pitung: The History of an Indonesian Legend·, in *BKI* 152, No. 3, 1996, p. 462.

[77] Smail, John R. W. Bandung in *the Early* Revolution, *1945-1946:* A *Study* in *the Social History of the* Indonesian Revolution, Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1964, p. 88.

[78] Onghokham (b), ·The Pulung-Affair: A Tax-Payers Revolt from Patik: Aspects of Nineteenth Century Rural Politics in Java·, in Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands 19-22 May 1976, Leiden and Jakana: Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1978, p. 74.

[79] Onghokham (b), ·The Pulung-Affair: A Tax-Payers Revolt from Patik: Aspects of Nineteenth Century Rural Politics in Java·, in Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands 19-22 May 1976, Leiden and Jakarta: Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1978, p. 74-75.

[80] Suhartono, *Bandit-bandit Pedesaan: Studi Historis 1850-1942* di *Jawa*, Yogyakarta: Aditya Media, 1995, p. 148.

[81] Salmon, Claudine.· The Han Family of East Java.Entrepreneurship and Politics (18th-19th Centuries)·, in *Archipel*, Volume 41, 1991, p. 63.

[82] Suhartono, *Bandit-bandit Pedesaan: Studi Historis 1850-1942 di Jawa*, Yogyakarta: Aditya Media, 1995, pp. 147-148.

[83] Schulte Nordholt, Henk ·The *Jago* in the Shadow: Crime and ·Order· in the Colonial State in Java·, in RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, p. 82.

[84] Boeka (P.C.C. Hansen Jr.), *Pah* Troeno, Amsterdam: F van Rossen, 1901, pp. 27-29.

[85] Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence· , in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), Roots *of Violence* in Indonesia: *Contemporary* Violence in *Historical Perspective*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 39-40..

[86] Terms used to denote spies were *weri* or *telik* according to Suhartono (1995: 100).

[87] Schulte Nordholt, Henk ·The *Jago* in the Shadow: Crime and ·Order· in the Colonial State in Java·, in RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, pp. 78 and 85.

[88] Lucas, Anthony Edward. The *Bamboo Spear Pierces the Payung: The* Rewlution *Against* the *Bureaucratic Elite* in *North Central Java* in *1945*, PhD Thesis, Canberra: Australian National University, 1981, pp. 37-38.

[89] Lucas, Anthony Edward. *The Bamboo Spear Pierces the Payung: The Revolution Against the Bureaucratic* Elite in *North Central Java* in *1945*, PhD Thesis, Canberra: Australian National University, 1981, p. 164.

[90] Onghokham, ·The *Jago* in Colonial Java, Ambivalent Champion of the People·, in Andrew Turton and Shigeharu Tanabe (Eds.), Histroy and Peasant Consciousness in *South* East *Asia,* Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1984, p. 328.

[91] Schulte Nordholt, Henk ·The *Jago* in the Shadow: Crime and ·Order· in the Colonial State in Java·, in RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, pp. 77.

[92] Schulte Nordholt, Henk ·The *Jago* in the Shadow: Crime and ·Order· in the Colonial State in Java·, in RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, pp. 81.

[93] Kartodirdjo, Sartono, *The* Peasants' *Revolt of* Banten in *1888,* Its Conditions, *Course,* and *Sequel:* A *Case Study of Social* Movements in Indonesia, ·s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 57-58.

[94] Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, *Memori Serah Jabatan 1931-1940 Jawa Barat (I),* Jakarta: Penerbitan Sumber-sumber Sejarah No. 11, 1980, p. XX.Ill. Furthermore, Williams stated that this organization was originally a mutual aid society which had its own administration, treasurer and local branches. Some branches had their own president and secretary with members paying monthly contributions (1990: 281).

[95] Tihami, M. A., Kiai dan *Jawara* di Banten: Studi tentang *Agama, Magi,* dan *Kepemimpinan* di *Desa Pasanggrahan* Serang, Banten. MA Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 1992, pp. 99-100.

[96] Wilson, Ian Douglas. *The Politics of* Inner *Power: The Practice of* Pencak *Silat* in *West Java,* Ph.D Thesis, Murdoch University, 2003, p. 249.

[97] Sunatra. *Integrasi dan* Konflik: *Kedudukan Politik* Ulama-Jawara *dalam Budaya Politik Lokal:* Studi *Kasus Kepemimpinan Informal Pedesaan* di *Banten Selatan,* Ph. D. Thesis, Universitas Padjadjaran, 1997, p. 138.

[98] Bruinessen, Martin van, ·*Shari·a* court, *tarekat* and *pesantren:* Religious Institutions in the Banten Sultanate·, in Archipel,Volume 50, *Banten* Histoire *d'une* region, 1995, pp. 187-191.

[99] Hudaeri, ·Tasbih dan Golok·, unpublished article for the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2002, p. 44.

[100] Hudaeri, ·Tasbih dan Golok·, unpublished article for the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2002, pp. 44-53; Wilson, Ian Douglas. *The Politics of Inner Power: The Practice of* Pencak *Silat* in *West Java,* Ph.D Thesis, Murdoch University, 2003, p. 245; and Sunatra. Integrasi dan Konflik: *Kedudukan Politik* Ulama-Jawara *dalam Budaya Politik Lokal: Studi Kasus Kepemimpinan Informal Pedesaan* di *Banten Selatan,* Ph. D. Thesis, Universitas Padjadjaran, 1997, pp. 100-101.

[101] Ensering, Else, ·Banten in Times of Revolution·, in *Archipel,* Volume 50: *Banten* Histoire *d'une* region, 1995, pp. 149.

[102] Williams, Michael C. *Communism, Religion and Revolt* in *Banten,* Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1990, pp. 257-258 and Sunatra. Integrasi *dan Konflik: Kedudukan* Politik Ulama-Jawara *dalam Budaya Politik Lokal:* Studi *Kasus Kepemimpinan Informal Pedesaan* di *Banten Selatan,* Ph. D. Thesis, Universitas Padjadjaran, 1997, pp. 100-101.

[103] Masaaki, Okamoto. ·Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia: the Governor General of Banten Province·, in IIAS *Newsletter,* No. 34, July 2004, p. 23 and Mansur, Khatib. *Profil Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib beserta Komentar 100 Tokoh Masyarakat Seputar Pendekar Banten,* Jakarta: Pustaka Amara Utama, 2000, pp. 79-82.

[104] Suhaedi, H.S. *Jawara* Banten: *Kajian Sosial-Historis* tentang *Mobilitas Sosial Jawara,* MA Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2006, p. 132.

[105] Masaaki, Okamoto. ·Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia: the Governor General of Banten Province·, in IIAS *Newsletter,* No. 34, July 2004, p. 23.

[106] In order to avoid the negative image that had come to be ssociated with the term *jawara,* it was replaced with "pendekar". See, Wilson, 2003: 258. However, Tihami who conducted research into *jawara* in 1992 did not agree with the term pendekar, due to the non-originality of the word pendekar in Bantenese languages. See the interview with Tihami in Mansur, 2000: 268.

[107] Wilson, Ian Douglas. *The Politics of* Inner *Power:* The *Practice of Pencak Silat* in *West Java,* Ph.D Thesis, Murdoch University, 2003, p. 258..

[108] Suhaedi, H.S. *Jawara* Banten: *Kajian Sosial-Historis* tentang *Mobilitas Sosial Jawara,* MA Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2006, p. 137-140.

[109] Masaaki, Okamoto and Abdul hamid, ·*Jawara* in Power, 1999-2007,· in *Indonesia* 86, October 2008, pp. 126-135.

[11°] Kroef, Justus M. Van der. ·"Petrus": Patterns of Prophylactic Murder in Indonesia,· in Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 7, July 1985, pp. 757-758.

[111] Pemberton, John. On *the Subject of "Java",* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994, pp. 311-318; Siegel, James T. ·A New Criminal T$_{y\,p}$e in Jakarta: the Nationalization of "Death",· in Rafael, Vicente L. (Ed.), *Figures of* Criminality in Indonesia, *the Philippines, and Colonial* Vietnam, Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 1999, pp. 225-230; and Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence·, in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of Violence* in *Indonesia: Contemporary* Violence in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, p. 28.

[112] Schulte Nordho!t, Henk ·The *Jago* in the Shadow: Crime and ·Order· in the Colonial State in Java·, in RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, p. 89.

m Yapto is the son of a Javanese General and a Dutch Jew and Yorrys is a half-Chinese, half-Papuanese. Both of them are the most influential leaders of PP. Both Yapto and Yorrys have occupied positions controlling manpower. See Ryter, 1998: 45-73.

[114] Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence· , in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of* Violence in *Indonesia: Contemporary Violence* in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, p. 48.

[115] Ryter, Loren. ·Pemuda Pancasila: the Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto· s Order?,· in Indonesia 66, October 1998, pp. 49.

[116] On 3 April 1983, Lt. Colonel M. Hasbi (commander of the Yogyakarta Military District 0734) issued a statement to *Kedaulatan Rakyat,* a regional newspaper in Yogyakarta area: 'All criminals, whether they operate individually or join together in a gang or a particular group, should surrender themselves at once to the officials' (Pemberton, 1994: 311). It is clear that the authorities did not really pay attention whether *gali* operated alone or belonged to a certain group.

[117] Blok, Anton ·The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered·, in *Comparative Studies* in *Society and History,* Vol. 14, No. 4 (September 1972), pp. 498.

[118] Ryter, Loren. ·Pemuda Pancasila: the Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto· s Order?,· in Indonesia 66, October i998, pp. 49.

[119] Gunawan, F.X. Rudy and Nezar Patria, *Premanisme Politik,* Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 2000, p. 52. All four elements (now only three, minus Polri, the

police) in armed forces during the Suharto regime had a number of companies under Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (Army), Yayasan Adi Upaya (Air Force), Yayasan Bhumyamca (Navy) and Yayasan Brata Bhakti (the poiice). See Gunawan and Patria, 2000: 51.

[120] According to Bourchier, police found out that on many occasions the weapons used by criminals in robberies were of military origin, implying direct collaboration between military men and criminals. See Bourchier, 1994: '182-183.

[121] Lindsey, Tim. "The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New Indonesia", in Lloyd, Grayson and Shannon Smith, Indonesia *Today: Challenges of History* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), pp. 285-290.

[122] Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence·, in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), Roots *of* Violence in. Indonesia: *Contemporary* Violence in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 48-49.

123 Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence· , in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), Roots *of* Violence in Indonesia: *Contemporary Violence* in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, p. 39; Onghokham (a), ·The Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation into the Sources of the Brotodiningrat Affair', in Ruth McVey, Southeast *Asian* Transitions: *Approaches through Social History,* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978, p. 133; Rush, James R. *Opium to Java: Revenue* Farming *and Chinese Enterprise* in *Colonial* Indonesia, *1860-1910,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990, p.108; and Onghokham (b), 'The Pulung-Affair: A Tax-Payers Revolt from Patik: Aspects of Nineteenth Century Rural Politics in Java· , in Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands 19-22 May 1976, Leiden and Jakarta: Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1978, pp. 74-75.

[124] Blok, Anton (b). ·The Meaning of ·Senseless· Violence·, in Anton Blok, Honour *and Violence,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 106.

[125] Blok, Anton (b). ·The Meaning of ·Senseless· Violence· , in Anton Blok, Honour and Violence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 106-107.

[126] Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence·, in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), Roots *of* Violence in Indonesia: *Contemporary* Violence in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 39-40.

Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict R. 0 ·G. *lava* in *a* Time *of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972.

Anderson, Benedict R. 0 ·G. *Imagined Communities: Reflections* on *the Origins and Spread of Nationalism,* London: Verso, 1991.

Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, *Memori Serah Jabatan 1931-1940 Jawa Barat (I),* Jakarta: Penerbitan Sumber-sumber Sejarah No. 11, 1980.

Blok, Anton 'The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered', in *Comparative Studies* in *Society and History,* Vol. 14, No. 4 (September 1972), pp. 494-503.

Blok, Anton (a). 'Social Banditry Reconsidered·, in Anton Blok, *Honour and Violence,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 14-28.

Blok, Anton (b). 'The Meaning of 'Senseless' Violence·, in Anton Blok, *Honour and Violence,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 103-114.

Blok, Anton (c). 'Bandits and Boundaries: Robber Bands and Secret Societies on the Dutch Frontier (1730-1778), in Anton Blok, Honour *and* Violence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 29-43.

Boeka (P.C.C. Hansen Jr.), *Pah Troeno,* Amsterdam: F van Rossen, 1901

Bourchier, David. 'Crime, Law and State Authority in Indonesia', in Arief Budiman (Ed.), *State and Civil Society in* lndonesia,Clayton: Monash University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1994.

Bruinessen, Martin van, *'Shari·a* court, *tarekat* and *pesantren:* Religious Institutions in the Banten Sultanate', in Archipd,Volume 50, *Banten* Histoire *d'une* region, 1995, pp. 165-199.

Colombijn, Freek. ·What is so Indonesian about Violence?', in Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (Eds), Violence in *Indonesia,* Hamburg: Abera, 2001, pp. 25-46.

Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), 'Introduction', in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), Roots *of Violence* in Indonesia: *Contemporary* Violence in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 1-31.

Cribb, Robert. *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People·s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949,* North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1991.

Cribb, Robert. 'From Total People's Defence to Massacre: Explaining Indonesian Military Violence in East Timor', in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of Violence* in *Indonesia: Contemporary Violence* in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 227-241.

Cribb, Robert. 'Legal Pluralism, Decentralisation and the Roots of Violence in Indonesia', in Dewi Fortuna Anwar et al (Ed.), *Violent Internal Conflicts* in *Asia Pacific:* Histories, *Political Economies and Policies,* Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005, pp. 41-57.

Dijk, Kees van. 'The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, Explaining the Unexplainable: *Amuk Massa* in Indonesia', in Colombijn, Freek

and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of* Violence in Indonesia: *Contemporary Violence* in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 277-297.

Eklof, Stephan. ·The 1965-1966 Killings in Bali: Historical and Cultural Approaches·, in Husken, Frans and Huub de Jonge (Eds.), Violence and Vengeance: Discontent and Conflict in *New Order* Indonesia, Saarbrucken: Verlag fur Entwicklungspolitik Saarbrucken, 2002, pp. 116-142.

Emmerson, Donald K. *Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976.

Ensering, Else, ·Banten in Times of Revolution· , in *Archipel,* Volume 50: *Banten Histoire d'une region,* 1995, pp. 131-163.

Groneman, Isaac. *Een Ketjoegeschiedenis,* Dordrecht: J.P. Revers, 1887.

Gunawan, F.X. Rudy and Nezar Patria, *Premanisme Politik,* Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus lnformasi, 2000.

Heryanto, Ariel. State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging, London: Routledge, 2006.

Hobsbawm, E.J. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement* in *the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959).

Hobsbawm, Eric. *Bandits,* New York: Delacorte Press, 1969.

Hobsbawm, E. J. ·Social Banditry', in Henry A. Landsberger (Ed.), *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change,* London: Macmillan, 1974, pp. 142-157.

Hudaeri, ·Tasbih dan Golok·, unpublished article for the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2002.

Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Peace Index: 2010 Methodology, Results* and Findings, Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010

Kartodirdjo, Sartono, The *Peasants· Revolt of* Banten in *1888, Its* Conditions, *Course,* and *Sequel:* A *Case Study of Social Movements* in Indonesia, ·s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.

Kartodirdjo, Sartono. ·Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development· , in Holt, Claire (Ed.), *Culture and Politics* in Indonesia, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 71-125.

Kartodirdjo, Sartono. *Protest Movements* in *Rural Java:* A *Study of Agrarian Unrest* in *the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries,* Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Kroef, Justus M. Van der. '"Petrus": Patterns of Prophylactic Murder in Indonesia,· in Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 7, July 1985, pp. 745-759.

Lev, Daniel S. ·The Criminal Regime: Criminal Process in Indonesia· , in Vicente L. Rafael (Ed), *Figures of Criminality* in *Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam,* Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1999.

Lindsey, Tim. "The Criminal State: *Premanisme* and the New Indonesia", in Lloyd, Grayson and Shannon Smith, *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), pp. 283-297.

Lucas, Anthony Edward. The *Bamboo Spear Pierces the Payung: The Revolution Against the Bureaucratic Elite* in *North Central Java* in *1945,* PhD Thesis, Canberra: Australian National University, 1981.

Mansur, Khatib. *Profil Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib beserta* Komentar *100 Tokoh Masyarakat Seputar Pettdekar Banten,* Jakarta: Pustaka Antara Utama, 2000.

Masaaki, Okamoto. ·Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia: the Governor General of Banten Province·, in HAS *Newsletter,* No. 34, July 2004, p. 23.

Masaaki, Okamoto and Abdul hamid, ·*Jawara* in Power, 1999-2007,' in *Indonesia* 86, October 2008.

Milton, Giles. *Nathaniel·s Nutmeg: How One Man·s Resolve Changed the World,* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1999.

Nas, Peter J. M. and Pratiwo, 'Java and De Groote Postweg, La Grande Route, the Great Mail Road, Jalan Raya Pos ·, in ***BKI,*** 2002, No. 4, pp. 707-725.

O'Malley, Pat. 'Social Bandits, Modern Capitalism and the Traditional Peasantry: A Critique of Hobsbawm' , in *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 6: 4 (1979), pp. 489-501.

Onghokham, ·The Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation into the Sources of the Brotodiningrat Affair', in Ruth McVey, *Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches through Social* History, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978 (a), pp. 112-157.

Onghokham, ·The Pulung-Affair: A Tax-Payers Revolt from Patik: Aspects of Nineteenth Century Rural Politics in Java', in Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands 19-22 May 1976, Leiden and Jakarta: Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1978 (b), pp. 64-78.

Onghokham, ·The *Jago* in Colonial Java, Ambivalent Champion of the People·, in Andrew Turton and Shigeharu Tanabe (Eds.), *Histroy and Peasant Consciousness in South East Asia,* Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1984, pp. 327-343.

Pemberton, John. On *the Subject of "Java",* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994.

Poensen, C. *Brieven over den Islam uit de Binnenlanden van Java,* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1886.

Pribadi, Yanwar. *Jawara* in *Banten: Their Socio-Political Roles* in *the New Order Era 1966-1998,* M.A. Thesis, Leiden University, 2008.

Quinn, George. ·The Javanese Science of Burglary·, in RIMA, 9, 1, January-June 1975: 33-54.

Reid, Anthony. *The Blood of the People: Revolution and the* End *of Traditional Rule* in *Northern Sumatra,* Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Robinson, Geoffrey. ·State, Society and Political Conflict in Bali 1945-1946·, in *Indonesia,* Vol. 45 (1988), pp. 1-48.

Rush, James R. *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise* in *Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910,* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Ryter, Loren. ·Pemuda Pancasila: the Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto· s Order?,· in Indonesia 66, October 1998, pp. 45-73.

Salmon, Claudine.· The Han Family of East Java.Entrepreneurship and Politics (18th-19th Centuries)·, in *Archipel,* Volume 41, 1991.pp. 53-87.

Schulte Nordholt, Henk ·The *Jago* in the Shadow: Crime and ·Order· in the Colonial State in Java·, in RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, pp. 74-91.

Schulte Nordholt, Henk. ·A Genealogy of Violence· , in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (Eds.), Roots *of Violence* in *Indonesia: Contemporary Violence* in *Historical Perspective,* Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 33-61.

Schulte Nordholt, Henk ·Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency and Identity in Post-Soeharto Indonesia·, in *BKI,* Vol. 159, No. 4, 2003, pp. 550-589.

Schulte Nordholt, Henk and Margreet van Till, ·Colonial Criminals in Java, 1870-1910, in Vicente L. Rafael (Ed), *Figures of Criminality* in *Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam,* Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1999.

Siegel, James T. 'A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: the Nationalization of "Death",' in Rafael, Vicente L. (Ed.), *Figures of Criminality* in Indonesia, *the Philippines, and Colonial* Vietnam, Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 1999, pp. 210-230.

Smail, John R. W. *Bandung* in *the Early Revolution, 1945-1946:* A *Study* in *the Social History of the Indonesian Reo.)Olution,* Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1964.

Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity,* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991.

Smith, Anthony D. "Nations and History," in M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson (Eds.), *Understanding Nationalism,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 9-31.

Suhaedi, H.S. *Jawara Banten: Kajian Sosial-Historis tentang Mobilitas Sosial Jawara,* MA Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2006.

Suhartono, *Bandit-bandit Pedesaan: Studi* Historis *1850-1942 di Jawa,* Yogyakarta: Aditya Media, 1995.

Sunatra. *Integrasi* dan *Konflik: Kedudukan Politik* Ulama-Jawara *dalam Budaya Politik Lokal: Studi Kasus Kepemimpinan Informal Pedesaan di Banten Selatan,* Ph. D. Thesis, Universitas Padjadjaran, 1997.

Tihami, M. A., *Kiai dan Jawara di Banten: Studi* tentang *Agama, Magi,* dan *Kepemimpinan di Desa Pasanggrahan Serang, Banten.* MA Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 1992.

Till, Margreet van. 'In Search of Si Pitung: The History of an Indonesian Legend', in *BKI* 152, No. 3, 1996, pp. 461482.

Wessel, Ingrid. 'Introduction', in Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (Eds), *Violence* in *Indonesia,* Hamburg: Abera, 2001, pp. 8-14.

Williams, Michael C. *Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten,* Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1990.

Wilson, Ian Douglas. *The Politics of* Inner *Power: The Practice of Pencak Silat in West Java,* Ph.D Thesis, Murdoch University, 2003.

Wulfften Palthe, P. M. van (a). *Over het Bendewezen op Java,* Amsterdam: Van Rossen, 1949.

Wulfften Palthe, P. M. van (b), *Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian Problem,* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949.